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NOTES

RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS-ENFORCEABILITY OF ASSESSMENTS AGAINST PROPERTY OWNERS IN RESIDENTIAL DEVELOPMENTS-Figure Eight Beach Homeowners' Association, Inc. v. Parker, 62 N.C. App. 367, 303 S.E.2d 336, disc.
rev. denied, 309 N.C. 320, 307 S.E.2d 170 (1983).
INTRODUCTION

Historically, the legal system has favored the free and unfettered use of land and has strictly construed attempts to broaden
any limitations on that use.' This general rule has been particularly applicable to private restrictive convenants incorporated into
residential deeds.2 Restrictive covenants allow the granting property owner to retain limited control over the use of the property,
which he can exercise in the event of breach by actions for damages for injunctive relief.3 The subject of these restrictions can
range from the prohibition of certain improvements on the property,4 to monetary assessments for maintenance, improvements, or
quasi-governmental services.' Those which establish monetary assessments are actually affirmative covenants-promises to do an
affirmative act 6-that have been included with the restrictive covenants. This distinction is significant because the common law
placed a heavier burden on the running of affirmative covenants
than it placed on negative or restrictive covenants. Affirmative
1. Long v. Branham, 271 N.C. 264, 156 S.E.2d 235 (1967); Callaham v. Arenson, 239 N.C. 619, 80 S.E.2d 619 (1954).
2. P. HETRICK, WEBSTER'S REAL ESTATE LAW IN NORTH CAROLINA § 384 (rev.
ed. 1981).
3. Id. at § 385.
4. See Hullett v. Grayson, 265 N.C. 453, 144 S.E.2d 206 (1965).

5. See Figure Eight Beach Homeowners' Ass'n. v. Parker, 62 N.C. App. 367,
303 S.E.2d 336 (1983).
6. Tulk v. Moxhay, 2 Ph. 774 (1848) (distinguishing negative and affirmative
covenants).
7. G.

THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY
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covenants were generally construed as personal to the original
grantee and therefore ceased to be enforceable upon subsequent
conveyance.8 Both restrictive and affirmative covenants have created unique problems of enforceability.
Several recent cases involving residential development projects
have questioned the enforceability of affirmative covenants requiring the payment of assessments. The seminal question posed by
the eariler cases was whether the contested covenants were personal to the original grantee 9, or "run with the land." 10 More recent decisions have tended to find that affirmative covenants "run
with the land," but remain unenforceable because the covenants
were vague as to the purpose and amount of the levied
assessments. "
The North Carolina Court of Appeals in Figure Eight Beach
Homeowners' Associatin v. Parker, rejected the defendant property owner's interpretation of several earlier decisions.1 2 The property owner claimed the earlier decisions required affirmative covenants to contain some ascertainable standards by which the court
could objectively determine the amount and purposes of the assessments.1 3 The Court of Appeals claimed, however, it was applying the same standards set forth in the earlier decisions regarding
the enforceability of similar covenants. In essence, the court's
adoption of a broader interpretation of the earlier case law validates stricter enforcement of assessment covenants by property
owners' assocations which seek revenues to provide services to the
residential development. Why the court took this position in light
of the language of its earlier decisions, as well as the impact of the
decision on residential development in North Carolina, will be the
3153 (repl. 1962).
8. See Id. at § 3154.
9. Stegall v. Hous. Auth., 278 N.C. 95, 178 S.E.2d 824 (1971).
10. See Raintree Corp. v. Rowe, 38 N.C. App. 664, 248 S.E.2d 904 (1978);
Neponsit Property Owners' Ass'n v. Emigrant Indus. Say. Bank, 278 N.Y. 248, 15
N.E.2d 793 (1938).
11. Snug Harbor Property Owners' Ass'n v. Curran, 55 N.C. App. 199, 284
S.E.2d 752 (1981) disc: rev. denied, 305 N.C. 302, 291 S.E.2d 151 (1982); Beech
Mountain Property Owners' Ass'n v. Seifart, 48 N.C. App. 286, 269 S.E.2d 178
(1980).
12. Snug Harbor Property Owners' Ass'n v. Curran, 55 N.C. App. 199, 284
S.E.2d 752 (1981); Beech Mountain Property Owners' Ass'n v. Seifart, 48 N.C.
App. 286, 269 S.E.2d 178 (1980).
13. Beech Mountain Property Owners' Ass'n v. Seifart, 48 N.C. App. 286,
295, 269 S.E.2d 178, 183 (1980).
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subjects of this note. An examination of the earlier decisions interpreting similar covenants, along with similar decisions from other
jurisdictions, will give a proper framework for analysis of the Figure Eight decision.
THE CASE

A property owners' association sought payment of assessments
allegedly owed to it by several property owners of Figure Eight Island, a barrier island off the coast of North Carolina." In the mid1960's, residential development of Figure Island began with the
sale of individual residential lots by Island Development Co., subject to certain covenants recorded in the county registry." The
original development company conveyed its island property to another company, which later conveyed and assigned its interests to
Continental Illinois Realty (CIR) through a trustee in
bankruptcy."
Concurrently with development of the island community, a
non-profit corporation, the Figure Eight Beach Homeowners' Association, Inc., was formed.1 7 Its purposes were (a) "[tlo bring together property owners of that area . . ." and (b) "engage in any

lawful activity including, but not limited to operating parks and
playgrounds, fire and police departments and contracts for services
which might be from time to time deemed desirable . .

.,,I

The by-laws of the association empowered its Board of Directors to set the amount of dues and assessments to be paid by its
members, who under the restrictive covenants, were to be all purchasers of property on Figure Eight Island.1 9 By recording their
deeds, purchasers agreed to be bound by the registered covenants,
the charter, and by-laws of the association.2"
The recorded covenants included provisions governing their
applicability, reserving the right to change or modify the covenants, and dictating the nature and extent of assessments to be
levied.2" The language of the affirmative covenant which contained
14. 62 N.C. App. at 367, 303 S.E.2d at 337.
15. Id. at 368, 303 S.E.2d at 337.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. (as stated in the documents of incorporation).
19. Id.
20. Id. The Association recorded a Declaration of Restrictive Covenants in
the New Hanover County Registry.
21. The pertinent provisions of the restrictive covenants are set out at 62
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the contested assessment provisions including the following statements of amount and purpose:
(b) [s]uch assessment or charge shall be in an amount to be fixed
from year to year by the Company, which may establish different
rates from year to year as it may deem necessary and may establish different rates for various general classifications of lots according to the use or location of said lots. The Company may levy
additional assessments if necessary to meet the needs of the entire Island or portion thereof.
(c) [tihe funds arising from said assessment or charge or additional assessment may be used for any or all of the following purposes: Maintaining, operating and improving the bridges; protection of the property from erosion; collecting and disposing of
garbage, ashes, rubbish and the like; maintenance and improvement of the streets, roads, drives, rights of way, community land
and facilities, tennis courts, marsh and waterways; employing
watchmen; enforcing these restrictions; and, in addition, doing
any other things necessary or desirable in the opinion of the Company to keep the property in neat and good order and to provide
for the health, welfare and safety of owners and residents of Fig22
ure Eight Island.

Amended restrictions, recorded by CIR in 1978, modified the statement of purpose for the levying of assessments and indicated the
assignment of enforcement rights to the Figure Eight Beach Prop23
erty Owners' Association, Inc.

The homeowners' association continually levied and collected
assessments and dues from its members from the time of its creation in 1966, although a written assignment of the rights "to levy,
collect, and expend annual and special assessments" was not made
until 1979.4 This assignment of rights was apparently in response
to attempts by the association to enforce collection of these assessments against property owners in various court actions.25
Defendants purchased lots on Figure Eight Island in 1972 and
1976, subject to the terms and conditions of the recorded coveN.C. App. at 370-73, 303 S.E.2d at 338-40.
22. 62 N.C. App. at 371, 303 S.E.2d at 338-39.
23. Id. at 369, 303 S.E.2d at 338.
24. Id.
25. Id. In an unpublished opinion, the North Carolina Court of Appeals held
that the Property Owners' Association must present written evidence of the
claimed assignment of rights to enforce the covenants in order to be entitled to
the requested relief.
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nants.26 In 1979, defendants were billed for an annual assessment
of $382.00 for residences and $255.00 for lots, and a special assesment of7 $275.00 per lot for construction of a new a bridge to the
island.1

In March 1982, the trial court granted plaintiff's motion for
summary judgment, denied defendants' motion for summary judgments, and entered judgment ordering defendants to pay the
amounts owing on their respective assessments."' Defendants' appeal advanced three question: whether the affirmative covenant to
pay assessments2 9 was unenforceable due to its vagueness, uncer26. 62 N.C. App. at 369-70, 303 S.E.2d at 338.
27. Id. at 373, 303 S.E.2d at 340.
28. Id. at 374, 303 S.E.2d at 340.
29. Paragraph 8 of the recorded covenants provided:
8. Assessments: (a) The owner of each residential lot shall, by the acceptance of a deed or other conveyance for such lot, be deemed obligated to
pay to the Company an annual assessment or charge to be fixed, established and collected on a lot by lot basis as hereinafter provided. Said
annual assessment or charge to be fixed, established and collected on a
lot by lot basis as hereinafter provided. Said annual assessment or charge
shall be due on January 1 of the year for which it is assessed, provided
that the Company may make provision for payment thereof in installments. Each annual assessment or charge (or installment thereof) shall,
when due, become a lien against the lot against which such assessment or
charge is made. Upon demand, the Company shall furnish to any owner
or mortgagee a certificate showing the assessments or charges, or installments thereof, due as of any given date. Each lot subject to these restrictions is hereby made subject to a continuing lien to secure the payment
of each assessment or charge (or installment thereof) when due.
(b) Such assessment or charge shall be in an amount to be fixed
from year to year by the Company, which may establish different rates
from year to year as it may deem necessary and may establish different
rates for various general classifications of lots according to the use or
location of said lots. The Company may levy additional assessments if
necessary to meet the needs of the entire Island or portion thereof.
(c) The funds arising from said assessment or charge or additional
assessment may be used for any or all of the following purposes: Maintaining, operating and improving the bridges; protection of the property
from erosion; collecting and disposing of garbage, ashes, rubbish and the
like; maintenance and improvement of the streets, roads, drives, rights of
way, community land and facilities, tennis courts, marsh and waterways;
employing watchmen; enforcing these restrictions; and, in addition, doing
any other things necessary or desirable in the opinion of the Company to
keep the property in neat and good order and to provide for the health,
welfare and safety of owners and residents of Figure Eight Island.
(d) Upon the failure of the owner of any lot to pay any such assess-
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tainty, and failure to state an ascertainable standard, whether the
covenants were enforceable by an assignee of the original grantor,
and whether enforcement of the assessment covenants violated
public policy.30 The court of appeals limited its review to the first
question, but found the defendants' other assertions to be without
substantial merit.8 1 Under a three-pronged analysis, the court concluded: 1) the assessment covenants were sufficiently definite in
terms of purpose and amount, 2) the property to be maintained
ment or charge, additional assessment, or installment thereof when due,
the Company shall have the right to correct the amount thereof by an
action at law against the owners as for a debt, and may bring and maintain such other suits and proceedings at law or at equity as may be available. Such rights and powers shall continue in the Company and the lien
of such charge shall be deemed to run with the land and the successive
owners of each lot, by the acceptance of deeds therefor, shall be deemed
personally to assume and agree to pay all unpaid assessments or charges
or additional assessments which have been previously levied against the
property, and all assessments or charges or additional assessments shall
become a lien thereon during their ownership. Unpaid assessments or
charges, additional assessments, or installments thereof, shall bear interest at six percent (6%) from the due date thereof, until paid.
(e) The monies collected by virtue of the assessments or charges or
additional assessments, of the lien provided by this section, shall be paid
to the Company to be used in such manner and to the extent as the
Company may determine, in accordance with paragraph 8(c) hereof, for
the benefit of the residents of Figure Eight Island. The judgment of the
Company in the making of assessments or charges or additional assessments and the expenditure of funds shall be final.
(f) The Company shall not be obligated to spend in any one calendar year all of the sums collected during said year by way of assessments
or charges or additional assessments and may carry forward to surplus
any balance remaining. The Company shall not be obligated to apply any
such surplus to the reduction of charges in the succeeding year.
(g) The Company shall have authority, in its discretion, to borrow
money to expend for the purposes set forth in paragraph 8 (c) hereof
upon such terms and security and for such periods as it may determine,
and to repay said borrowings and the interest thereon from the assessments or charges or additional assessments provided for in this paragraph 8.
(h) It is contemplated that the Company may, in its discretion, assign to the Figure Eight Island Homeowners' Association, its successors
or assigns, the right to make and collect assessments, to expend such
funds as may be collected, and to otherwise be substituted for the Company under this paragraph.
30. 62 N.C. App. at 374, 303 S.E.2d at 340.
31. Id.
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was described with particularity, and 3) there was no question as
to which properties and facilities the association sought to maintain with the assessments.3 2 The court found no genuine issue of
material fact and affirmed the trial court's granting of summary
judgment."3
BACKGROUND

The law governing the enforceability of restrictive covenants
requiring the payment of monetary assessments for maintenance
or improvements in residential developments was generally nonexistent in North Carolina up until the last decade. 4 Prior to Figure Eight, developers or property owners' associations received little support from the judiciary in their attempts to collect money
from property owners in the form of levied assessments.3 3
Courts applied the general rule of construction for restrictive
covenants in North Carolina as stated in the 1967 decision of Long

v. Branham:"
Covenants and agreements restricting the free use of property are strictly construed against limitations upon such use. Such
restrictions will not be aided or extended by implication or enlarged by construction to affect lands not specifically described,
or to grant rights to persons in whose favor it is not clearly shown
such restrictions are to apply. Doubt will be resolved in favor of
the unrestricted use of property so that where the language of a
restrictive covenant is capable of two constructions, the one that
limits, rather than the one which extends it, should be adopted,
and that construction should be embraced which least restricts
the free use of the land.
Such construction in favor of the unrestricted use, however,
must be reasonble. The strict rule of construction as to restrictions should not be applied in such a way as to defeat the plain
32. Id. at 376-77, 303 S.E.2d at 342.
33. Id. at 377, 303 S.E.2d at 342.
34. The first case that considered the enforceability of assessment covenants
was Beech Mountain Property Owners' Ass'n v. Current, 35 N.C. App. 135, 240
S.E.2d 503 (1978).
35. See Snug Harbor Property Owners' Ass'n v. Curran, 55 N.C. App. 199,
284 S.E.2d 752 (1981); Beech Mountain Property Owners' Ass'n v. Seifart, 48 N.C.
App. 286, 269 S.E.2d 178 (1980); Raintree Crop. V. Rowe, 38 N.C. App. 664, 248
S.E.2d 904 (1978); Beech Mountain Property Owners' Ass'n v. Current, 35 N.C.
App. 135, 240 S.E.2d 503 (1978).
36. 271 N.C. 264, 156 S.E.2d 235 (1967).
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and obvious purposes of a restriction.37
Until June 1983, it appeared the North Carolina courts would
refuse to enforce any assessment covenant no matter how detailed
or carefully the developer drafted the recorded restrictions for the
development. 8 Such a policy was disastrous for real estate developers and residential developments which relied on the private assessments for maintenance and upkeep of the common areas in the
development.
Prior decisions involving such covenants presented few guidelines to developers or their attorneys for drafting covenants that
would withstand the challenge of individual property owners who
refused to pay the levied assessments. The two basic issues addressed in the early decisions were usually: whether the covenant
ran with the land, which would allow its enforcement against subsequent grantees,-9 and whether the present holder of the right to
enforce the assessment was in fact the real party in interest to assert such rights. 0 The typical case involved conflicts over the enforcements of the assessments coveants between successors in interest of the original grantee and the original grantor or his
assigns. 41
The 1978 case of Beech Mountain Property Owners' Association v. Current4 was the first North Carolina case in which the
court was presented with the issue of assessment covenants against
property owners in a residential development. The defendant
claimed the covenant was unenforceable as written,"3 but the court
refused to rule on the substantive issue opting instead to hold that
the plaintiff lacked capacity to assert any claim to the assessment
because the restrictive covenant provided that only owners of
37. Id. at 268, 156 S.E.2d at 239 (citing 20 AM. JUR. 2D,

COVENANTS, CONDI-

TIONS AND RESTRICTIONS § 187 (1965)).

38. See generally, Beech Mountain Property Owners' Ass'n v. Seifart, 48
N.C. App. at 287-90, 269 S.E.2d at 179-80 (1980). (Beech Mountain Property
Owners' Association recorded three sets of "Declarations of Restrictions," and detailed Articles of Incorporation).
39. Raintree Corp. v. Rowe, 38 N.C. App. 664, 248 S.E.2d 904.
40. Id.
41. In Raintree Corp. v. Rowe, 38 N.C. App. 664, 248 S.E.2d 904 (1978), the
original developer, the Ervin Company, sold its interests in the development to
ARDC Franciscan Terrace, Inc., which sought to enforce the assessment covenants under its new corporate name, Raintree Corporation.
42. 35 N.C. App. 135, 240 S.E.2d 503 (1978).
43. Id. at 136, 240 S.E.2d at 505.
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property would have the right of enforcement."" The association, as
a separate corporate entity, lacked standing because it held no
property in the development under its own name. 5
The court held inapplicable a similar New York case, Neposit
Property Owners' Association v. Emigrant Industry Say. Bank,'6
which held that the assignee-association was a real party in interest to bring an action for enforcement of the assessment.47 The
court noted the distinction in the Neponsit covenant which "expressly conferred a right of action on the grantor's 'assigns,' which
expressly included the property owners' assocation."' 8 The language of the Beech Mountain covenant made no express provision
for assignment; therefore, under strict construction, the court refused to allow the assocation to enforce the covenant."9
In Raintree Corporationv. Rowe, 50 the court again refused to
enforce covenants to pay assessments because the corporate plaintiff was not the proper party to collect the assessments under the
recorded covenant.5 1 Interestingly, country club dues were also
held uncollectible because they lacked the status of a real covenant.5 2 The court cited as three requirements to create an enforceable real covenant: 1) the intent of the parties as can be determined from the instruments of record; 2) the covenant must be so
closely connected with the real property that it touches and concerns the land; and, 3) there must be privity of estate between the
parties to the covenant.""5 As personal covenants between original
grantor and defendants, the club dues requirement could not be
assigned or enforced by any other party.5 ' The court did not indicate whether it considered such covenants as enforceable as assignable contract rights.
The 1980 case of Beech Mountain Property Owners' Association v. Seifart55 involved the same covenants as the 1978 deci44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. at 138-39, 240 S.E.2d at 506-07.
Id. at 139, 240 S.E.2d at 507.
278 N.Y. 248, 15 N.E.2d 793 (1938).
Id. at 254, 15 N.E.2d at 794-95.
35 N.C. App. at 139, 240 S.E.2d at 507 (1978).
Id.
38 N.C. App. 664, 248 S.E.2d 904 (1978).
Id. at 668, 248 S.E.2d at 907.
Id. at 670-71, 248 S.E.2d at 908-09.
Id. at 669, 248 S.E.2d at 908.
Id. at 671, 248 S.E.2d at 909.
48 N.C. App. 286, 269 S.E.2d 178 (1980).
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sion," but prior to instituting this suit, the property owners' association acquired property at Beech Mountain and several
individual property owners were also joined as plaintiffs.57 The
court held that the covenants upon which the association relied to
make assessments were not "sufficiently certain and definite to be
enforceable."5 8 "[Clovenants purporting to impose affirmative obligations on the grantee [should] be strictly construed and not enforced unless the obligation [is] . . . imposed in clear and unambiguous language which is sufficiently definite to guide the courts
in its application." 59 Comparing similar decisions"0 from other jurisdictions which advocate some "ascertainable standard contained
in the covenant," 61 the court arrived at a three-pronged analysis to
examine the enforceability of the Beech Mountain covenants.
First, "[nlone of the covenants identified with particularity the
property to be maintained."6 Secondly, "there is nothing in the
covenant which can guide the court should it be called upon to
review the determination by the Property Owners' Assocation as to
what particular roads and trails it elects to maintain."63 Finally,
"there is no clearly defined limiting standard by which the court
can determine whether the assessment made in any particular year
against any particular property owner is authorized both as to
amount and purpose by the covenant applicable to his property."',
Although lauding the desirable function of the association and the
enhancement of property values its activities provide, the court
found this an insufficient basis upon which to enforce the covenants. 5 The court did not offer any explanation for its pronouncement which in effect invalidated many of the assessment covenants
already in place in residential developments throughout North
Carolina.
56. Beech Mountain Property Owners' Ass'n v. Current, 35 N.C. App. 135,
240 S.E.2d 503 (1978). See supra text accompanying notes 39-45.
57. 48 N.C. App. at 287 n.1, 269 S.E.2d at 179.
58. Id. at 294, 269 S.E.2d at 182.
59. Id. at 295, 269 S.E.2d at 183.
60. See Kell v. Bella Vista Village Property Owners' Ass'n, 258 Ark. 757, 528
S.W.2d 651 (1975); Peterson v. Beekmere, Inc., 117 N.J. Super. 155, 283 A.2d 911
(1971); Rodruck v. Sand Point Maintenance Comm'n, 48 Wash. 2d 565, 295 P.2d
714 (1956).
61. 48 N.C. App. at 295, 269 S.E.2d at 183.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 296, 269 S.E.2d at 183.
64. Id. at 297, 269 S.E.2d at 184.
65. Id.
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Under the same analysis, the court in Snug Harbor Property
Owners Association v. Curran6 held similar restrictive covenants e7
unenforceably vague 6 8 Even though a specific dollar amount of annual dues was stated in the covenant, "the property to be maintained was described with even less particularity [than in Beech
Mountain], and there [was] no standard by which the maintenance
[was] to be judged."' 9
Four Seasons Homeowners Association v. Sellers,70 a 1983
case, upheld the assessments levied against property owners in the
residential development. Although defendants improperly excepted
to the findings of fact in the appeal, 1 the court, in dicta, indicated
that the covenants were enforceable under the Raintree72 decision
because they ran with the land. 73 Defendants did not contend that
the covenants were unenforceably vague under the three-pronged
7 4 therefore, the court did not address
analysis of Beech Mountain;
this issue.
In summary, prior to FigureEight75 the North Carolina Court
of Appeals had consistently refused to enforce assessment covenants if challenged as to the purpose and amount of the claimed
assessment. The three-pronged analysis of Beech Mountain7 6 appeared to be an insurmountable hurdle for the enforcement of
most affirmative covenants applicable to residential development,
which created havoc in real estate developments which relied on
the assessments as a form of private taxation to fund the maintenance and upkeep of the community.
66. 55 N.C. App. 199, 284 S.E.2d 752 (1981), disc. rev. denied, 305 N.C. 302,
291 S.E.2d 151 (1982).
67. For the language of the applicable Snug Harbor restrictions, see 55 N.C.
App. at 200-02, 284 S.E.2d at 753-54.
68. 55 N.C. App. at 204, 284 S.E.2d at 755.
69. Id.
70. 62 N.C. App. 205, 302 S.E.2d 848 (1983) disc. rev. denied 307 S.E.2d 364
(1983).
71. Id. at 207, 302 S.E.2d at 850.
72. 38 N.C. App. 664, 248 S.E.2d 904. See also supra text accompanying

notes 46-50.
73. 62 N.C.
74. 48 N.C.
75. 62 N.C.
76. 48 N.C.

App.
App.
App.
App.

at 210-11, 302 S.E.2d at 852-53.
286, 269 S.E.2d 178.
367, 303 S.E.2d 336 (1983).
286, 269 S.E.2d 178.
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ANALYSIS

In Figure Eight,77 the court upheld the granting of plaintiff's
motion for summary judgment because under the three-pronged
analysis established in Beech Mountain,8 the assessment covenant
was not unenforceably vague.7 9 First, the court found the language
of the restriction "sufficiently definite in its terms that the purpose
and amount of the annual and special assessments in question
clearly '[fell] within the contemplation of the covenant.' "80 Under
the terms of the restriction, there was a sufficient standard against
which to measure the property owners' liability.81 Second, the
court found that the property to be maintained by the association
was described with particularity in the restriction which was duly
recorded in the county registry. s2 The map of the entire island including roads, lots, and other improvements, registered with the
Declaration of Restrictive Covenants, provided support for the
trial court's conclusion." Last the court found no question as to
which properties and facilities the association was to maintain and
improve with revenues from the property assessments.8" The court
refused to accept the interpretation by defendants of the Beech
Mountain8 5 decision that "restrictive covenants must provide the
reviewing court with a standard by which it can objectively determine the amount of the assessment."" The covenants were found
to be sufficient to guide the trial 7 court in reviewing the assessments claimed by the association.
The significance of the Figure Eight decision lies not in its
application to this particular residential development, but in the
implications this decision has in light of the line of cases 8 affirming the unenforceability of similar assessment covenants. In
Figure Eight, the court seems to have re-examined its strict inter77. 62 N.C. App. 367, 303 S.E.2d 336.
78. 48 N.C. App. 286, 269 S.E.2d 178.
79. 62 N.C. App. at 377-78, 303 S.E.2d at 342.

80. Id.
81. Id. The Court, however, does not explain how the trial court is to determine or measure liability under this standard.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. 48 N.C. App. 286, 269 S.E.2d 178.
86. 62 N.C. App. at 376, 303 S.E.2d at 342.
87. Id. at 377, 303 S.E.2d at 342.
88. See supra text accompanying notes 39-65.
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pretation of the language in assessment covenants governing their
purpose and amount and derived an analysis which allows property
owners' associations to more easily enforce its assessments, in order that the development as a whole might benefit.8 9 The court
rejected the view that restrictive assessment covenants must contain "some ascertainable standard . . . by which the court can objectively determine both that the amount of the assessment[s] and
the purpose for which [they are] levied fall within the contemplation of the covenant." 90
In conducting the three-pronged analysis established under
the 1980 Beech Mountain9 ' decision, the court looked first to the
language of paragraph 8 of the Declaration of Restrictive Covenants.92 The court found that "any reading. . . of paragraph 8 (c)
would provide a standard against which to measure the property
owner's liability."9 3 Yet accompanying the report of the court's
opinion are both the original,9 4 and an amended9" paragraph 8(c),
which contains the additional terms of: "replacing the bridges;...
and "paying . . .indebtedness of the Association, insurance premiums, governmental charges of all kinds and descriptions."9' Although these terms mention specific purposes for the assessments,
the mere fact that the affirmative covenants have been amended
indicates an indefiniteness as to the extent of the maintenance obligation to be borne by the property owners under the assessments
covenants. The degree of variance in the possible uses of the assessed funds appears to negate any definite limit on a property
owner's liability. Secondly, the court examined the covenant to determine if the "property to be maintained [was] described with
particularity. ' 97 The court concluded that given the recorded map
of the Island along with the Declaration of Restrictions," the trial
89. See 62 N.C. App. at 373, 303 S.E.2d at 340. The Court mentions that
assessments were levied for construction of a new bridge, which was "the only
land based transportation access to the island." Id.
90. Beech Mountain Property Owners' Ass'n v. Seifart, 48 N.C. App. 286,
295, 269 S.E.2d 178, 183 (1980).
91. Id.
92. See text of paragraph 8 at supra note 28.
93. 62 N.C. App. at 377, 303 S.E.2d at 342.
94. See id. at 371, 303 S.E.2d at 339.
95. See id at 373, 303 S.E.2d at 340.
96. Id.

97. Id. at 377, 303 S.E.2d at 342.
98. The restrictive covenants were recorded by the Figure Eight Island Company in Book 933, at Page 286 of the New Hanover County Registry, Wilmington,
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court could not have reached any conclusion other than that the
property was sufficiently described. 99 Again, as noted above,
amendments to the restrictions, although allowed under the
modificiation provisions of the covenants, indicate significant
faults in the description of the property to be maintained. Under
paragraph 8(c), it is unclear whether the assocation could use the
assessment funds for such specialized purposes as to protect individual lot owners from the damages of erosion. The phrase "any
other things necessary or desirable in the opinion of the Company
. ."

would appear to allow any property to be maintained re-

gardless of the particularity requirement.
Finally, the court found "no question as to which properties
and facilities the [Homeowners' Association] [determined] to
maintain with the contested assessments."101 Based on the references in defendants' deeds to the map and the restrictive covenants, the court concluded that defendants had notice of all
properties to be maintained. 102 Because there were no after-acquired properties or facilities maintained by the association, the
court indicated that the referenced property could sufficiently
guide the court in reviewing the assessments.10 3 This statement indicates a willingness on the part of the court to adopt a wait-andsee attitude for this prong of the Beech Mountain test. The decision leaves open the question of whether the restriction would have
been enforceable if the association had acquired more property of
significantly improved facilities on the Island. Under the reservation provision of the covenants,104 the Company, solely within its
judgment, can alter or redesignate facilities. The lack of any limitation concerning defendants' liability of assessements on future
acquisitions of property or facilities offers little guidance to defendants on the financial feasibility of continued ownership of property on the island. If, under the court's interpretation of the language in the Figure Eight covenant, the association could agree to
North Carolina. Id. at 370, 303 S.E.2d at 338.
99. On March 10, 1982, the trial court granted plaintiff's motion for summary
judgment and denied defendants' motion for summary judgment. 62 N.C. App. at
374, 303 S.E.2d at 340.
100. See paragraph 8(c). 62 N.C. App. at 373, 303 S.E.2d at 340.
101. 62 N.C. App. at 377, 303 S.E.2d at 342.
102. Id.
103. Id. The Court did not consider the planned construction of a new bridge
to constitute after acquired property.
104. See paragraph 3. 62 N.C. App. at 370, 303 S.E.2d at 338.
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open new roads or waterways, then it would seem the covenant was
no more definite than the Beech Mountain covenant which was
unenforceably vague.
The court in Figure Eight appears to have abandoned the
strict constructionist view it seemed to adopt under Beech Mountain, in favor of a less rigid approach which allows the court to
uphold the enforcement of residential assessment covenants. In
considering the beneficial functions-security, maintenance, and
sanitation-the property owners' assocationsprovide to the residential community, the court seems to conform its judgment to the
best interest of the association. By affirming the trial court's decision, the North Carolina Court of Appeals sends a signal to individual property owners that claims of vagueness in assessment covenants will no longer provide an easy way out of paying
assessments. Of course, this assumes that such covenants are
drafted in language consistent with those in Figure Eight. In the
end however, the opinion of the court fails to contribute siginificant clarity to the primarily factual determination under the threepronged Beech Mountain test.
Under the Beech Mountain test, the key elements are but enigmatic standards within themselves. The court does not clearly indicate what standard is sufficient to measure the liability for assessments, nor what particularity is needed for a sufficient
description of property to be maintained. Finally, it is unclear how
the trial court is to review the determination of the association as
to which facilities to maintain. Under the Figure Eight interpretation, there seems to be no limitation or guiding standard to aid
developers or their attorneys in drafting enforceable covenants. By
using the Beech Mountain test to reach a seemingly contrary result in an almost identical factual situation, the court only "muddied the waters" for future cases.
Although the court in Beech Mountain did not expressly
adopt the view in other jurisdictions' 5 which stress "the necessity
for some ascertainable standard contained in the covenant by
which the court can objectively determine both that the amount of
the assessment and the purpose for which it is levied fall within
the contemplation of the covenant,"'' 6 it did indicate a need for
105. See supra note 59.
106. Beech Mountain Property Owners' Ass'n v. Seifart, 48 N.C. App. at 295,
269 S.E.2d at 183 (1980).
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some sufficient standard. 10 7 The courts of several jurisdictions have
required that assessments contain a "formula for the calculation of
the amount of the assessment."' 108 A New Jersey court, in Peterson
v. Beekmere, Inc.,109 noted that the lack of a formula for calculating assessments or any limitation on the duration of the covenant,
bound property owners to unspecified obligations. ° In Rodruck v.
Sand Point Maintenance Commission,"' a Washington decision,
the court upheld enforcement of a covenant under which "the
amounts of the individual assessments are governed by a set standard."'1 2 By upholding the Figure Eight covenant without establishing some criteria for objectively judging the amount and purpose of the assessment within the terms of the covenant, the court
left review of enforceability to the caprice of the trial court.
If the court in Figure Eight, had analyzed the contested covenants by noting why these covenants met the standards for enforceability and those in the Beech Mountain' 3 and Snug Harbor"" did not, developers and individual property owners would
have some basis for drafting more definite and binding restrictive
covenants in their residential developments. From the decision, it
might be assumed that assessment covenants drafted in the Figure
Eight format would be adequate to justify enforcement in other
residential developments, but the lack of more objective standards
of review seems to weaken their usefulness under this decision.
Under the Figure Eight covenants, the only limitations are
those imposed by agreement among the members of the property
owners' association. 15 The majority in the association could not alter the covenants without the approval of the minority, but under
the Figure Eight covenant, the majority could significantly increase the amount of the annual assessments, thereby adversely affecting the minority. The individual's only ultimate remedy would
107. Id.
108. Kell v. Bella Vista Village Property Owners' Ass'n, 258 Ark. 757, 528
S.W.2d 651, 655 (1975).
109. 117 N.J. Super. 155, 283 A.2d 911 (1971).
110. Id. at 175, 283 A.2d at 922.
111. 48 Wash. 2d 565, 295 P.2d 714 (1956).
112. Id. at 580, 295 P.2d at 721.
113. 48 N.C. App. 286, 269 S.E.2d 178.
114. 55 N.C. App. 199, 284 S.E.2d 752.
115. The property owners' association was made up of all property owners
within the development. Under the provisions of the assignment of interest to the
association, the assessment covenants would be enforced under the terms of the
articles of incorporation of the association.
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appear to be the sale of his property interests in the development,
perhaps at a greatly deflated price. If the covenants provided some
specific monetary or durational limitations on the assessment of
funds from property owners, the community would benefit in that
a calculable source of funds would be available for the association's
activities, and at the same time, the individual property owner
would be protected from unreasonable assessments. By upholding
enforcement of the Figure Eight covenants, the court would appear to endorse this lack of protection for the individual property
owner. The court obviously assumes that in order to protect the
individual's interests, he would be well advised to actively participate in the decision-making process of the association.
Since the Figure Eight decision did not enumerate any "ascertainable" standard of enforceability, the court has left open the
door for further litigation on the enforceability of residential assessment covenants. Before Figure Eight, it was relatively clear
that the court opposed enforcement of assessment covenants under
broad statements of the purpose and amount of such assessments.
Now, although it appears the court sees value in, enforcing such
assessments, it is unclear which of the court's views to apply in any
particular factual situation. Admittedly, there are two competing
views which the court must address. On the one hand, the developer and typically, a majority of the proprety owners in the development, rely on the covenants to provide the authority for the necessary "private taxation" to fund the maintenance of the private
real estate development. This form of assessment allows for internal control of the development and the exclusion of governmental
or public influence from the development. Under this view, it
would only seem fair that lot purchasers with notice of the assessment covenants should be estopped to deny the enforceability of
the assessments. However, the court also must consider the view of
the property owner who is justifiably disturbed when the property
owners' association tripled the annual assessment from one year to
the next. The court of appeals realized in Figure Eight that the
strict interpretation under Beech Mountain against the development's interests, unfairly burdened one view, even though the covenants legitimately sought to benefit the interests of all the property owners in the community.
CONCLUSION

Figure Eight upheld the enforceability of assessment covenants in a residential development, finding the covenants suffi-

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1984

17

Campbell
Law Review,
7, Iss. 1 [1984], Art. 2
CAMPBELL
LAWVol.
REVIEW

[Vol. 7:33

ciently certain and definite in that they provided a standard
against which to measure a property owner's liability for assessments and sufficiently described the properties and facilities to be
maintained and improved with revenues from the assessments.
Under the three-pronged analysis of Beech Mountain, the Court
held for the first time that a residential assessment covenant was
not unenforceably vague. The benefits provided to the development by the property owners' association appears to have outweighed the infringement the levied assessments place on the individual property owner. The fault with the decision is its lack of
ascertainable standards for reviewing enforceability of similar assessment covenants. The next case in this area will likely rest upon
the subjective determination of the trial judge in his attempt to
strictly construe covenants with the flexible ruler of Figure Eight.
Ernest Rawls Carter, Jr.
Monty Beck
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